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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that the Nation's economic, political, and social security
require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a
matter of high priority, the Nation's goal of equal educational opportunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy of the United States of
America that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or
1
her full potential without financial barriers.

The above quote is the “national policy with respect to equal educational
opportunity” Congress enacted in 1974 as part of the General Education
Provisions Act.2 The highly aspirational statement suggests Congress
wanted the states to take decisive and comprehensive action in educating
the citizens of the United States. The statement further suggests the federal government was willing, if not entirely prepared, to provide the financial backing for such an undertaking.
1.
2.

20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 (2012).
Id.

1
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However, this aspiration ended up being nothing more than that for
many United States’ citizens with disabilities.3 Rather than seeking to
meet the full potential of students with disabilities, individual states have
largely provided students with disabilities an education that meets only
the minimum legal requirements.4 Following Congress’s enactment of
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), the Supreme Court interpreted a key provision of this act, which requires states to provide a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) to students with disabilities, to require nothing more than a showing that the student received some “educational benefits” from their public education.5
In the decades since that decision, the circuit courts have split as to
what standard they should use to evaluate whether a student has received
a FAPE, with several circuits applying a higher standard which requires
“meaningful educational benefits.”6 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has
faithfully applied the educational benefit standard the Supreme Court
established and continued to do in its recent decision in Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1.7 When the Tenth Circuit panel decided to adhere to precedent, it missed the opportunity to
call for a new legal standard with which courts could evaluate the quality
of the education students with disabilities receive.
Fortunately, on September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court accepted
certiorari, giving it the opportunity to establish a new legal standard. This
Comment will explain how the legal standard applied by the Tenth Circuit gives rise to serious problems, necessitating the development of a
new standard. Further, as this comment discusses, recent federal legislation concerning both special and general education policy demonstrates
that the “some educational benefit” standard is no longer sufficient. Finally, this Comment will put forward a proposed new legal standard that
more closely reflects Congress’s inspirational goal of educating all U.S.
citizens to reach their full potential.

3. This comment will use the terminology “person with disability” rather than “disabled
person” as this is the language preferred by persons with disabilities. Disability Etiquette: Tips on
Interacting with People with Disabilities, UNITED SPINAL ASS’N., (last visited May 29, 2016). Similarly, this term will replace the word “handicapped” in any quote.
4. See Robert Caperton Hannon, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 VAND. L. REV. 715, 733 (1997).
5. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 206–07 (1982).
6. Scott Goldschmidt, A New Idea for Special-Education Law: Resolving the “Appropriate”
Educational Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2011).
7. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341 (10th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Foundation
In 1966, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, appropriating funds dedicated to the provision of special education services for the first time.8 Nearly a decade later, Congress found
that out of the 8 million children with disabilities in the United States,
more than half were not receiving an appropriate education that would
provide them with “full equality of opportunity.” Moreover, Congress
found the public school system had completely excluded 1 million of
these children.9 Furthermore, many students in the public school system
were failing academically because educators had not yet identified their
disabilities.10 However, Congress found the states were otherwise able to
provide effective education to students with disabilities, and had a responsibility to do so, but did not have the funds to accomplish the task.11
Therefore, federally funded assistance to the states in meeting the needs
of students with disabilities was of national interest, resulting in the
EHA.12
The stated purpose of the EHA was “to assure that all . . . children
[with disabilities] have available to them . . . a free appropriate public
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . .”13 Under the EHA, states receiving federal assistance must provide a student with a disability with a
FAPE regardless of the severity of the student’s disability.14 Additionally, Congress required states to develop training to teach educators how to
identify possible disabilities in students and to lay out what steps educators should take if they suspect a student has a disability.15 However, the
FAPE requirement was the key provision of the EHA. Federal law defines a FAPE as “special education and related services which (A) have
been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, [and] (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved . . . .”16

8. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750, sec. F, § 601, 604, 608–
09, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204–08 (1966) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a)–(l), 881–85).
9. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3(a), § 601, 89 Stat. 773, 774
(1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 775.
12. Id.
13. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1401(c)).
14. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 172–173 (3d Cir. 1988).
15. Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & Health 139, 144 (2007).
16. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 4(a), § 602, 89 Stat. 773, 775
(1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(18)).
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Under the EHA, special education consists of “specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs
of a . . . child [with a disability], including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals
and institutions.”17 Instruction is “specially designed” by “adapting the
content, methodology or delivery of instruction to meet a student’s
needs.”18 Related services include “developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a . . . child [with a
disability] to benefit from special education . . . .”19
As the EHA defined these terms, schools were required to provide
students with disabilities access to the same curriculum as their nondisabled peers.20 Congress specified the means by which states would provide this access. Once a school has identified a student with a disability,
the school would be required to develop an individualized education program (IEP) to meet the unique needs of that student.21 The IEP is a written statement that includes “present levels of educational performance,”
annual goals, “the specific educational services to be provided . . . [,] the
extent to which [the] child will be able to participate in regular educational programs,” and criteria and procedures for evaluating “whether
instructional objectives are being achieved.”22 Although the EHA was
the most comprehensive special education legislation of its time, it
lacked details, leaving the Supreme Court with less information to interpret how to evaluate whether the school has provided the student with a
FAPE.23
B. Rowley Standard
The landmark case on the issue of how to determine whether a child
has received a FAPE is Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District, Westchester County v. Rowley.24 In Rowley, the Supreme
Court considered the situation of Amy, a deaf child whose teachers considered able to perform better than average academically, despite the fact
that her disability prevented her from understanding everything happening in the classroom. 25 The Court overturned the decision of the lower
court, which defined a FAPE as “an opportunity [for students with disa17. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(16)).
18. Mitchell L. Yell et al., Individualized Education Programs and Special Education Programming for Students with Disabilities in Urban Schools, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669, 689 (2013).
19. Education of the Handicapped Act § 602 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(17)).
20. Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based
IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L.R. 503, 508 (2011).
21. Education of the Handicapped Act § 602 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(18)).
22. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(19)).
23. See Hannon, supra note 4, at 726.
24. See Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 505.
25. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 185 (1982).
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bilities] to achieve [their] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”26 The Court held that in enacting the
EHA, Congress did not intend to guarantee students with disabilities
either any particular level of education or opportunity equal to that of
nondisabled students.27 Instead, the Court concluded, Congress sought to
provide a “basic floor of opportunity” to students with disabilities.28 The
Court provided lower courts with a two-part test to determine whether a
student has been provided with a FAPE: 1) did the state comply with
EHA procedural requirements and 2) was the resulting IEP “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”29 The
result of this test was a standard that equated some educational benefit to
an appropriate education.30
In concluding Congress sought only to establish a floor of educational opportunity for students with disabilities, the Court strictly interpreted the definition of FAPE in the EHA.31 In defining a FAPE, Congress used the words “to benefit,” rather than including language modifying the word “benefit.” Therefore, the Court reasoned Congress must
have meant that any educational benefit would be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the EHA.32
The Court additionally relied on other language in the statute, which
required states to prioritize extending educational services to children
with disabilities who were not receiving any education over those whose
education was merely inadequate.33 This priority, combined with the
FAPE definition, showed the Court that Congress’s intent was only to
provide students with disabilities access to public education, nothing
more.34 Thus, the Court rejected the idea that Congress went so far as to
require schools to maximize the potential of students with disabilities.35
To date, the Court has chosen not to revisit the some educational
benefit standard it established in Rowley. It has made this choice in spite
of the fact that the circuits have split as to how courts should evaluate the
sufficiency of an IEP.36

26. Id. at 186.
27. Id. at 192, 198, 200.
28. Id. at 201.
29. Id. at 206–07.
30. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 751.
31. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188–89.
32. Id. at 189.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 199.
36. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 762; Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A
Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 ED. L. REP. 1, 6 (2009).

6

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

C. Circuit Split
Confusing language in Rowley has led to a split among the circuits
as to what standard courts should apply to evaluate IEPs.37 In asserting
that Congress’s goal was primarily to give students with disabilities access to public education, the Court made this statement: “But in seeking
to [make public education available to children with disabilities], Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”38
The Third Circuit used this precise language to justify adoption of
an arguably higher standard than the one established in Rowley.39 A
number of other circuits have adopted this standard, commonly known as
the “meaningful benefit” standard. However, the Supreme Court’s language in Rowley is so confusing and imprecise that the circuit courts
have struggled to articulate precisely which standard they are applying.
As a result, scholars commenting on the split differ as to the number of
circuits that adhere to one standard or the other.40
Despite the disagreement as to which standard a given circuit applies, scholars generally agree the Third Circuit has consistently applied
a higher standard than the one announced in Rowley.41 The Third Circuit
initially developed the meaningful benefit standard in Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16,42 where it required schools to consider a student’s potential when developing an IEP.43 Although the Third
Circuit requires consideration of potential, it is important to note it does
not require schools to maximize potential.44 Further, although commentators often consider this a single standard, the Third Circuit has explicitly
rejected the idea that what constitutes an appropriate education for students with such diverse needs “could be reduced to a single standard.”45
However, the Third Circuit did set something of a universal standard by
37. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 751; Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the
Circuit Courts Denied a Free Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1, 6 (2005).
38. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
39. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 179–80 (3d Cir. 1988).
40. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339 n.8
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016); compare Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 758–59
(asserting that six circuit courts have adopted the heightened standard, while five use the Rowley
standard, with the last circuit applying a mixed standard), and Aron, supra note 37, at 7 (tallying up
a total of six federal appeals courts that apply the “meaningful benefit” standard), with Wenkart,
supra note 36, at 1 (stating that seven circuit courts have applied the “some educational benefit”
standard), and Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. &
EDUC. 25, 27 (2012) (stating that the majority of the circuit courts apply the “some educational
benefit” standard).
41. E.g., Wenkart, supra note 36, at 2; Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 760; Aron, supra note
37, at 7; Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 513.
42. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
43. Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 513.
44. Wenkart, supra note 36, at 3 (“. . . all courts have held that a school district is not required
to maximize each child’s potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.”).
45. Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 514.
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establishing in Polk that, for a student’s specialized education to constitute a FAPE, there must be evidence of more than a mere trivial or de
minimus benefit to the student.46
D. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In the late 1990s, Congress recognized it had set low expectations
for students with disabilities in enacting the EHA. 47 Thus, it significantly
amended the EHA, and renamed the law the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).48 These amendments added detailed procedures
for schools to follow during IEP development, providing some guidance
as to what courts could consider an “appropriate” education.49
A second round of significant amendments came in 2004.50 These
amendments specified three major components required for all IEPs.51
First, the IEP must include a statement of current academic achievement
and functional performance levels.52 This statement is the “starting point
from which [IEP] teams develop the IEP and measure its success.”53 The
statement must specifically include how the student’s disability affects
access to the general education curriculum, which allows the IEP team to
develop appropriate goals, interventions, and objectives to allow the student with a disability to be educated with his or her peers as much as
possible.54
Second, schools must include in the IEP annual goals capable of
measurement as well as how the school will measure progress towards
those goals.55 Schools base these goals on the statement of current academic achievement and functional performance levels with the objective
of mediating the academic or functional deficits the student’s disability
causes.56 This mediation should allow the student to participate and grow
under the general education curriculum.57 The measurable character of
the standards is important because without measurable standards, IEP
team would not be able to determine if the current accommodations and
interventions were effective for the student’s educational goals or if they
needed modification.58
46. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1988).
47. Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough Is No Longer Good
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 14 (2012).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012).
49. Valentino, supra note 15, at 144.
50. Id. at 155.
51. Yell et al., supra note 18, at 686.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 687.
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 687.
58. Id. at 687–88.
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Lastly, all IEPs must include a statement of the special education,
related, or supplementary services the student will receive.59 When developing this statement, schools must consider the actual needs of the
child rather than whether those services are currently available.60 Further,
the amount of time spent in the general education setting versus time
spent outside of that setting must be included, as well as an explanation
of where the student will be when not included in the general education
classroom.61 This delineation of time forces the IEP team to consider
whether more or less time with nondisabled peers is appropriate based on
that student’s needs.62
For students whose disabilities create behavior issues that inhibit
that student’s or other students’ ability to learn, the IEP must additionally
include a behavioral intervention plan (BIP).63 The term intervention is
key, as the plan is required to create and implement positive strategies
for managing or correcting the problematic behaviors rather than punishing the student.64 In Endrew, one of the petitioner’s main arguments was
the school’s failure to address Endrew’s behavior issues to such an extent
it had failed to provide him with a FAPE.
II. ENDREW F. EX REL. JOSEPH F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST.
RE-1
A. Facts
At the age of two, Endrew F. (Drew) was diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD).65 As a further complication, doctors diagnosed
Drew with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder a year later.66 ASD is a
developmental disability affecting several major areas of an autistic person’s life, including social interaction, cognitive functioning, verbal and
nonverbal communication abilities, and general educational performance.67
Unlike other developmental disorders, ASD is a spectrum, wherein
those diagnosed with it can exhibit a range of numerous symptoms
common to the disorder but no one symptom need always be present.68
59. Id. at 686.
60. Id. at 690.
61. Id. at 691.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 692.
64. Id.
65. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th
Cir. 2015) (“Endrew”), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016).
66. Id.
67. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, No. 12-CV-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at
*1, *1 (D. Colo. Sep. 15, 2014) (“Endrew F.”); Endrew at 1333.
68. Elizabeth Hervey Osborn, Comment, What Happened to “Paul’s Law”?: Insights on
Advocating for Better Training and Better Outcomes in Encounters Between Law Enforcement and
Persons with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 333, 339–40 (2008).
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Drew specifically has difficulty communicating his personal needs and
emotions, and he is unable to engage in normal social interactions with
others.69 Although all of Drew’s symptoms make daily life a struggle for
him, several symptoms interfere with his ability to learn and participate
in a traditional school setting.70 Specifically, Drew exhibits maladaptive
behaviors including fleeing the classroom and school building, dropping
his body to the ground, climbing on things, vocalizing very loudly with
perseverative language, and picking or scraping at his skin.71 Additionally, Drew fears dogs, flies, and using a new or public restroom so severely
it significantly inhibits his ability to function at school.72
Drew’s parents, Joseph and Jennifer, initially placed Drew into the
Douglas County School District (Douglas County), which he attended
until May of 2010, his fourth grade year of school.73 Although Douglas
County developed an IEP designed to meet Drew’s particular educational
needs, Drew’s parents felt he was not meaningfully progressing in his
education or development of functional skills.74 Drew’s parents further
felt Douglas County had failed to address adequately Drew’s increasingly serious disruptive behaviors.75 These behaviors, in addition to those
stated above, included urinating and defecating on the floor of the
school’s “calming room”; hitting or kicking computers, TV screens, and
walls; kicking others; and banging his head against walls.76 Although
previous IEPs contained a BIP, the plans only addressed one or two of
Drew’s disruptive behaviors and were never based on functional behavioral assessments (FBAs).77 Consequently, Joseph and Jennifer removed
Drew from his public elementary school, rejected the IEP Douglas County developed, and enrolled him at Firefly Autism House, which specializes in educating autistic children.78
After enrolling Drew at Firefly, his parents sought reimbursement
from Douglas County, arguing that because the public school had failed
to provide Drew with a FAPE it was required under the IDEA to provide
reimbursement for the private school tuition as well as reasonable transportation costs.79 After Douglas County refused, Drew’s parents went to

69. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *1.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016).
75. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *2.
76. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *2.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *1; Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333.
79. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333.
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the Colorado Department of Education and filed a due process complaint.80
B. Procedural Facts
Over the course of three days in June 2012, an administrative law
judge (ALJ) with the Colorado Office of Administrative Courts conducted the due process hearing.81 The ALJ concluded that, although the IEP
had minimal progress monitoring and lacked support for conclusory
statements about Drew’s progress, those deficiencies did not amount to
denial of a FAPE.82 The ALJ also rejected the parents’ contention that
Douglas County’s failure to conduct FBAs or implement a BIP designed
to address Drew’s increasingly disruptive behaviors resulted in denial of
a FAPE.83 Thus, the ALJ found for Douglas County and denied the reimbursement claim. 84
The parents filed for review of the ALJ decision in the U.S. District
Court of Colorado, which, in affirming the ALJ decision, reasoned that
Drew’s IEPs did reveal minimal progress in his education and functional
skills.85 Specifically, the district court noted that even though Douglas
County carried over the objectives listed on Drew’s IEP each year because they had not been met, it was “clear that the expectation in the
objectives are increased over time.”86 Regarding the behavioral issues,
the district court reasoned the school had addressed the problems and a
new BIP was in progress when Drew’s parents withdrew him from
Douglas County.87 Thus, Douglas County had met the minimum requirements of the IDEA.88 After the district court’s affirmation of the
ALJ decision, Drew’s parents appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which accepted the case for panel review.89
C. Panel Opinion
Judges Hartz, Tymkovich, and Phillips heard the case, with Judge
Tymkovich authoring the unanimous opinion.90 The appellate panel of
the court affirmed the district court decision, finding Douglas County did
not violate the IDEA and was therefore not required to reimburse Drew’s
parents for the cost of the private school tuition.91
80. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016); Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *9.
86. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *9.
87. Id. at *12.
88. See id.
89. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1332.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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To begin, the court outlined its analysis and noted it could order
Douglas County to reimburse Drew’s parents only if it found both that
Douglas County had denied Drew a FAPE and that the IDEA authorized
Drew’s placement at Firefly.92 To determine whether Douglas County
provided Drew with a FAPE, the court explained it must analyze two
issues, whether IDEA’s procedural requirements had been complied with
and whether the IEP resulting from those procedures was “‘substantively
adequate’ such that it [was] ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits.’”93
The court considered both the parents’ procedural and substantive
challenges.94 Drew’s parents specifically argued that the IEPs Douglas
County developed were procedurally deficient in two ways.95 The first
procedural challenge contended that Douglas County had deprived the
parents of the opportunity to participate in Drew’s education by failing to
provide adequate progress monitoring to them.96 In their second procedural challenge, Drew’s parents offered two alternative positions.97 First,
they asserted that Douglas County’s failure to conduct FBAs of Drew,
despite the severity of his behavioral issues, resulted in the denial of a
FAPE.98 Alternatively, regardless of the failure to conduct FBAs, Drew’s
parents argued that Drew did not receive a FAPE because the school
never implemented an appropriate BIP that would adequately address his
serious behavior issues.99
As to the first procedural challenge, the court found that the gaps in
progress monitoring on Drew’s IEPs did not prevent the parents from
participating in his education. In so finding, the court reasoned the evidence regarding frequent informal monitoring and communication between Drew’s special education teacher and his parents showed adequate
parental participation in Drew’s education.100 Furthermore, the court noted the parents reviewed Drew’s IEPs each year prior to implementation,
and made suggestions as to what they felt would be appropriate for their
son.101 In rejecting the parents’ argument that Drew’s case was factually
similar to a case out of an Alabama federal district court, the court stated
the critical difference was that in that case, the administrative hearing
officer had found that the reporting deficiencies clearly caused adverse
impacts to the child’s education.102 Because the ALJ in Drew’s case con92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
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cluded there were no such adverse impacts on Drew’s education, the
limited formal progress monitoring did not deny his parents an opportunity to participate in his education.103
The court next addressed the procedural challenge based on Drew’s
continuing and increasingly serious maladaptive behaviors.104 Here the
court relied directly on statutory interpretation, reasoning that this challenge could not truly be applied to Drew’s situation, as the statute only
requires implementation of a BIP if the student’s school placement has
changed as a result of a disciplinary decision; Drew had experienced no
such change.105 Absent any disciplinary change, the school must only
consider behavioral intervention, which Douglas County clearly did during Drew’s fourth grade year.106 In particular, the court mentioned the
steps Drew’s special education teacher took, including logging anecdotal
data of behavior incidents to determine Drew’s triggers and requesting
that a behavior specialist meet with the IEP team to develop a new behavior plan.107 Thus, the court found for Douglas County on both procedural challenges.108
As with the procedural challenges, Drew’s parents made two substantive arguments, the second of which has two subparts.109 The first
argument, which the court spent the most time addressing, asserted that
Tenth Circuit precedent called for application of the meaningful benefit
standard when evaluating whether Drew’s IEP was sufficient to meet
IDEA requirements.110 As to the second substantive argument, Drew’s
parents contended the IEPs were inadequate on the one hand because
they were not reasonably calculated to provide Drew with educational
benefit since Drew continually failed to meet his stated goals.111 On the
other hand, the parents argued the school neglected to consider the significance of the impact Drew’s behaviors had on his education when
developing the IEP the school believed was reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit.112
As to the substantive challenges, the court first discussed the proper
standard for courts to use when determining whether an IEP met the requirements of the IDEA and then addressed whether Drew’s IEP actually
met that standard.113 As to what standard the IDEA does require, the
court discussed the history of the case law interpreting the IDEA and its
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1338, 1341–42.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1338, 1341.
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predecessor. the EHA,114 much of which has been discussed above. The
court first addressed the circuit split wherein some circuits apply the
meaningful benefit standard.115 However, the court offered no substantive reasons for declining to apply the heightened standard, other than
stating in a footnote that “how much more benefit a student must receive
for it to be meaningful” is unclear.116 Instead, the court relied on the idea
that, being only a panel of the Tenth Circuit rather than the court sitting
en banc, Tenth Circuit precedent bound the panel to adhere to the some
educational benefit standard.117 Thus, the panel faithfully applied the
Rowley standard, allowing it to find no substantive violations of the
IDEA and to conclude that Douglas County had provided Drew with a
FAPE.118
In considering whether Drew’s IEP was sufficient, the court determined whether the evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the IEP
was reasonably calculated to provide Drew with some educational benefit.119 Specifically, the court looked at Drew’s past progress and found
that, despite the ALJ’s finding that the IEPs had little to no progress
monitoring or measurement data, the record supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Drew had made some academic progress.120 The court stated
that, despite the parents’ contention that Drew’s fifth grade IEP was
functionally the same as his previous IEPs, the “objectives and measuring criteria listed under the annual goals . . . typically increased with difficulty from year to year.”121 Additionally, the court noted that both
Drew’s mother and special education teacher testified that Drew made at
least some progress while enrolled in Douglas County.122
As to whether Douglas County’s handling of Drew’s behavioral
problems caused Drew’s IEP to be substantively inadequate, the court
found the county’s efforts, discussed above, in consulting with a behavioral specialist sufficient to show that Douglas County had adequately
addressed Drew’s behavioral problems.123 Furthermore, the court found it
important that, despite the severity of the behavioral problems, Drew was
still able to make some progress in his education.124 Thus, the court
found sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s presumptively correct
decision, commenting that the IDEA does not require schools to maxim-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1338–40.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1339 n.8.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1341–42.
Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342–43.
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ize student achievement or to ensure students reach any particular level
of knowledge at all beyond some progress.125
III. ANALYSIS
The circuit courts have split as to how they should evaluate whether
an IEP is sufficient to provide a student with a disability with a FAPE.
This has resulted in dramatically different educational services for students with disabilities depending upon which circuit they live in.126 If
Drew lived in a state within the Third Circuit, it is likely the Douglas
County IEP would have been found to violate the IDEA. This discrepancy in outcomes makes it clear; the Court must reconsider the standard
established in Rowley. However, this Comment will argue that, although
the some educational benefit standard is certainly inadequate, the meaningful education benefit standard the Third Circuit developed is similarly
insufficient to meet the needs of students with disabilities and honor
Congressional intent. Thus, the courts must develop a new standard, one
based upon concrete measurements.
A. The Source of the Problem
The discrepancy in required educational standards comes from the
less than clear language in Rowley discussed above. However, even if
every circuit applied the some educational benefit standard, a significant
problem would still exist. Specifically, the Rowley standard sets the bar
too low, essentially raising the requirement schools must meet only
slightly above a trivial educational benefit.127 In almost every other legal
context, the legal system requires courts to consider what is best for a
child, or at the very least, what situation is better for that child.128 However, when a child’s special education needs are at issue, Rowley creates
a potentially adversarial situation where parents want the best for their
child but the school does not have to reach that high. In other words,
schools can provide minimal services to students as long as the child
receives something more than a trivial educational benefit.129 There is a
further adversarial element to this situation. Special education providers
do not have total control over what services they provide to the student,
and school administrators often find it hard to justify the costs of additional services when they are not legally required.130 Thus, special education providers may be caught in the middle, with the desire to advocate

125. Id.
126. Johnson, supra note 40, at 27.
127. See Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 511–512 (arguing that despite courts’ assertions that the
benefit provided must be more than de minimus, circuit courts have repeatedly found that school
districts have provided a FAPE, no matter the trivial nature of the benefit received).
128. Johnson, supra note 40, at 25–26.
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id.
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for the student along with the parents but lacking the authorization from
the school district to do so.131
In addition to creating tension between parents, special education
providers, and school administrators, the Rowley standard results in
courts taking a minimalistic approach to these cases. This approach focuses on whether the student has passing grades or advances to the next
grade level each year.132 Although these goals are undoubtedly important
in the general education context, they can be less indicative of true academic or functional progress for some students with disabilities.133 For
example, many elementary schools no longer assess students with traditional grades.134 Additionally, even when traditional grades are used,
accommodations provided to the student result in grades higher than
those commensurate with the student’s skill level.135 The consequence is
a skewed picture of the educational benefit, which appears to be significant but in fact may only be trivial.
One commenter has suggested a solution to this problem in concert
with raising the substantive standard.136 Courts would consider grades as
to the question of progress measurement on a sliding scale that gives
more or less weight to the grades only if the student spends most of his
or her school time in the general education classroom.137 The weight of
the grades would be based on whether the graded courses use the same
curriculum as nondisabled students, whether that student’s assignments
are the same as nondisabled students, and whether the student with a
disability completed the work with accommodations that do not require
the student to complete the same academic tasks as nondisabled students.138 The commenter argues this solution is in line with the meaningful benefit standard, which requires courts to look beyond grades and
annual advancement to determine if a school has provided the student
with a FAPE.139

131. See Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864–65 (6th Cir. 2005).
132. Johnson, supra note 40, at 28.
133. Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Educational Program Requirements
Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been and Where Should
We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 496–97 (1991).
134. Emanuella Grinberg, Ditching Letter Grades for a ‘Window’ Into the Classroom, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 7, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/07/living/report-cardchanges-standards-based-grading-schools/.
135. See J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 6328033, at *1, *6 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 8, 2006); Johnson, supra note 40, at 39 (“Under the ‘some benefit’ approach, the focus
was on accommodating the student and escorting her through the educational system with grades
that were achieved with modified special education courses, the help of others doing tasks for the
student, and moderate expectations. Under the ‘meaningful benefit’ approach, these same results
would not be acceptable, and courts would enforce a higher standard.”)
136. Johnson, supra note 40, at 42–43.
137. Id. at 42.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 41.
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Nevertheless, only addressing one aspect of the problem the Rowley
standard has created does not go far enough. This is particularly true
when, as the United States District Court of Colorado stated, “ . . . an IEP
may have been reasonably calculated to achieve some benefit, yet fail to
do so in the end.”140 This statement is no less true when the standard is
elevated to meaningful. Furthermore, in asserting this as a defense of the
some educational benefit standard, the court did not address whether a
student would be provided with a FAPE when a court found the IEP to
be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits yet failed to
accomplish that for several years. The result of this situation could be a
student reaching secondary education levels without having achieved
many of the skills required to be successful in that setting.
B. Congressional Intent Has Expanded Beyond Simply Providing Access
In setting the standard for courts to evaluate IEPs, the Rowley court
relied heavily on the EHA’s provisions and legislative history to glean
from them that Congress only intended to provide students with disabilities access to public education and not any substantive level of educational benefit.141 In the time since Rowley, Congress has substantially
amended the EHA, suggesting its intent has shifted to something more
than simply providing students with disabilities access to public education.142
To address the problem of insufficient education for students with
disabilities, the first step was providing access. Thus, the EHA focused
on that first step, driving the Court’s interpretation in Rowley.143 However, Congress was motivated to amend the EHA because it recognized and
explicitly stated in the IDEA that the expectations it had set in the EHA
were low, impeding the original idea behind the law.144 This suggests
Congressional intent has shifted such that the goal is to assess the “actual
academic performance” of students with disabilities by demanding substantive guidelines for IEP evaluation.145 Further, a clear overarching
purpose of the IDEA is to provide students with disabilities with an education that would make college a reachable goal for as many students
with disabilities as possible.146 If the reasoning behind the Rowley standard was the intent of the EHA was only to provide access and if the

140. Tyler V., ex rel. Desiree V. v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. No. RE-1J, No. 07-CV-01094PAB-KLM, 2011 WL 1045434, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2011).
141. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 200–01 (1982).
142. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 5.
143. Id. at 6.
144. See Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004); see Kaufman,
supra note 47, at 14; see Valentino, supra note 15, at 145.
145. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 5; Valentino, supra note 15, at 141–42.
146. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 772–73.
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IDEA amendments show this intent has substantially changed, courts
need to alter the standard they apply to these cases.147
Several provisions of the IDEA support the argument that it is time
for a new standard based on concrete, measurable criteria. Congress even
amended the stated purpose of the IDEA to focus on “educational results
for children with disabilities.”148 Specifically, all services provided to a
student with a disability must be supported by peer-reviewed research,
which is necessarily results-based.149 Instead of schools determining unilaterally what services they find acceptable, they must be able to show
that other people, using the school’s desired method, have achieved substantive positive results.150 This requirement goes beyond simply providing students with disabilities a basic opportunity for education.151
An additional provision that supports implementation of a new
standard includes the new requirement to administer the standardized
tests that nondisabled students take to students with disabilities.152 This
focus on results is not only on student performance while in the public
education system, but after graduation as well. One amendment created a
new requirement for high schools, which must add post-secondary transition goals to IEPs once the student reaches the age of sixteen.153
The fact that schools are required to consider post-secondary goals
and functional life skills indicates Congress has shifted its intention away
from simple access to education and toward some level of selfsufficiency and independent living.154 To be in line with that intent,
schools must provide more than just some educational benefit, and courts
must change the standard they use to evaluate whether a school has provided a student with a FAPE.155 As the Sixth Circuit stated in Deal v.
Hamilton County Board of Education, “states providing no more than
some educational benefit could not possibly hope to attain the lofty goals
proclaimed by Congress [in the IDEA].”156
Finally, the enactment of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) suggests
courts should revisit Rowley.157 The stated purpose of NCLB is “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to
obtain a high-quality education . . . .”158 This groundbreaking act implemented massive reforms for federal education funding that focused on
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 773.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Valentino, supra note 15, at 158.
See id.
See id. at 158–59.
Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 6, 21; Valentino, supra note 15, at 155–157.
Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 773.
See Valentino, supra note 15, at 157.
See id. at 158.
Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004).
Johnson, supra note 40, at 29; Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 17.
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (emphasis added).
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demanding standards-based assessments.159 Under NCLB, states must
develop grade level standards, which schools use to administer the assessments and develop curricula.160 These standards tell administrators
and teachers “what students should know and be able to do at various
points and grade levels.”161 While Rowley “eschews student outcomes”
and considers only what an IEP is reasonably calculated to provide,
NCLB focuses primarily on student results.162
Under NCLB, standards-based assessment scores of most students
with disabilities must be included with the data in mandated progress
reports.163 This makes the goals behind NCLB informative as to how
courts should approach developing a new standard for evaluating whether a school has provided a student with a FAPE. In fact, Congress enacted the most recent IDEA amendments with the goal of aligning special
education law with the requirements of NCLB.164 This is further evidence that Congressional goals regarding special education have changed
significantly since Rowley was decided, necessitating a new legal standard.
In December 2015, Congress made significant changes to NCLB,
renaming it the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).165 Despite these
changes, which include reducing federal control over state standards,
most students with disabilities are still required to take the standardsbased assessments as often as nondisabled children are.166 Thus, while
the ESSA may change what is required of the general education curriculum, it does not change the fact that Congress amended the IDEA specifically to bring special education law into line with that of general education law.
C. Alternative Standards
Although it is clear that a new legal standard is necessary, what that
standard should be is less clear. Several circuit courts, following the lead
of the Third Circuit, have concluded that the meaningful benefit standard
adequately ensures schools will provide students with disabilities a
FAPE.167 However, “meaningful” is a term without definite boundaries.
Two different courts could look at the same IEP, examine the services
159. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 7.
160. See id. at 16.
161. Johnson, supra note 40, at 41.
162. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 8.
163. Id. at 5–6.
164. Id. at 18.
165. The Every Student Succeeds Act: Explained, EDUCATION WEEK (updated Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/12/07/the-every-student-succeeds-act-explained.html.
166. Michelle Diament, Education Law Tightens Testing Cap for Students With Disabilities,
DISABILITY SCOOP (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2015/12/10/educationtightens-testing-cap/21667/.
167. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 758–59; Aron, supra note 37, at 7; Wenkart, supra note 36,
at 1; Johnson, supra note 40, at 27.
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provided to the student, and differ as to whether the school has provided
the student with meaningful benefits. Even the Tenth Circuit has indicated it finds it difficult to distinguish what more the meaningful benefit
standard requires of schools beyond the Rowley standard.168 The struggle
to find precisely where educational benefits reach the point of being
meaningful suggests the meaningful benefit standard will eventually
prove to be unworkable. Little exists in the way of jurisprudence that
would definitively affirm there is a substantive difference between the
Rowley standard and the meaningful benefits standard.169
The new legal standard could find a basis in NCLB. Using the
standards-based assessments to evaluate whether a school has provided a
student with a FAPE would have a number of benefits. First, national
education policy would focus on student outcomes and satisfy Congressional intent170 Second, the results of the standards-based tests would
provide courts with a concrete tool for evaluating whether a school has
provided a student with a FAPE.171 Third, the struggle between parents
and special education providers would be reduced if not eliminated because both groups would be seeking the same goal: getting the student to
perform well on the tests.
Nevertheless, parents and special educators alike are hesitant to use
standards-based testing as a tool for measuring whether the student is
making educational progress because of the perception that test results do
not equate to substantive learning, particularly for students with disabilities.172 More importantly, the numerous difficulties of assessing the abilities of students with disabilities via standardized tests are well documented.173 Additionally, focusing solely on test results could produce
jurisprudence not substantively different from the Rowley standard. Given such a concrete measuring tool, courts might take a minimalistic approach to IEP evaluation similar to Rowley’s focus on passing courses
and advancing to the next grade each year.174
168. Wenkart, supra note 36, at 13.
169. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339 n.8
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016).
170. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1) (2012).
171. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 17.
172. Id. at 19. See also Matthew R. Plain, Results Above Rights? The No Child Left Behind
Act’s Insidious Effect on Students with Disabilities, 10 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 249, 267–68
(arguing that NCLB’s testing requirements could result in a loss of educational benefits and consequently an IDEA violation).
173. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 19. See also Rachel Loftin, Standardized Tests and
Students with an Autism Spectrum Disorder, INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON,
http://www.iidc.indiana.edu/pages/Standardized-Tests-and-Students-with-an-Autism-SpectrumDisorder (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); Joshua Bleiberg and Darrell M. West, Special Education: The
Forgotten Issue in No Child Left Behind Reform, BROOKINGS (June 18, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/18-special-education-no-child-left-behindbleiberg-west (“The assessment of students with disabilities will remain difficult until researchers
gain a better understanding of all cognitive disorders.”).
174. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 28.
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It is apparent any new standard must be more definite than the current standards, which are based on loosely defined terms like some and
meaningful, but not so defined as to be limited strictly to test results.
D. Reasonable Progress Standard
One of the Court’s concerns in Rowley involved the large burden
that would be placed on schools if they were required to maximize a student’s potential when developing an IEP.175 The facts of the Rowley case
were such that the Court could brush off consideration of a child’s potential as unnecessary. Amy Rowley, the child whose education was at
question in Rowley, performed better than many of her peers did.176 Despite the fact that the Court asserted it decided the case only on the facts
before it and did not seek to set a singular standard for IEP evaluation,177
Rowley did set a standard that has since allowed schools to discount the
potential of thousands of children with disabilities.
In the wake of this, many scholars have argued an appropriate
standard should be based on the child’s potential and the ways in which
the child is capable of learning.178 Failing to consider a child’s potential
seems counterintuitive to the idea of developing an individualized education program.179 Although the individualized nature of special education
suggests schools must consider potential, that alone is not enough. Like
meaningfulness, potential is hard to measure. Thus, any new legal standard, which hopes for better results than the current standards, must include something measureable.
An appropriate standard for evaluating whether a student has been
provided with a FAPE should be results-based. Rather than relying on
standardized test results, this Comment proposes a reasonable progress
standard. This standard measures whether the student makes reasonable
progress on annual goals. To develop these goals, the IEP team must
analyze and discuss the student’s capacity and potential. Rather than
focusing on maximizing potential, the reasonable progress standard focuses on tailoring IEP goals towards what the student is capable of
achieving with the proper special education services. Appropriate tailoring will of course require the IEP team to conduct appropriate evaluations to determine the child’s capability.180 Additionally, this standard
175. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192, 198–99 (1982).
176. Id. at 185.
177. Id. at 202.
178. Johnson, supra note 40, at 42.
179. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 (“It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end
of the [disability] spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other
end, with infinite variations in between.”); J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 447 F. Supp. 2d
553, 584 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[E]ducational benefit must be assessed based on the educational capacity
of each individual student.”).
180. Johnson, supra note 40, at 42.
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would require schools to document the results rather than documenting
goals only and allowing the IEP team to base progress towards those
goals on conclusory assertions.181
Courts commonly use the term reasonable in different areas of law,
with each usage having a slightly different meaning. However, unlike
some or meaningful, courts have found ways to put definite limits on
what is and is not reasonable.182 Similarly, in the context of IDEA, clear
boundaries exist to guide courts as to what constitutes reasonable progress. Specifically, under the standard this Comment proposes, a student
would make reasonable progress when the student is on pace, based on
the previous year’s progress, to meet the state’s grade-level standards for
the next level of education. Thus, throughout elementary school, the
gauge would be the state standards for the first level of middle school.
Similarly, while the student is in middle school, the grade-level standards
for high school would determine whether the student was making reasonable progress. However, to prepare high school students with disabilities for post-secondary life adequately, the measure of reasonable would
have to be more complex.
Unlike elementary and middle school, where the next step is generally the same for almost all students, what comes after high school is
uncertain, variable, and dependent on a number of extraneous factors.
The possibility of more than one post-secondary path necessarily creates
an additional step in the process. That is, schools must undertake to evaluate the student’s progress through middle school to determine which
path seems most appropriate.183 Three possible paths include preparation
for college, preparation for technical or vocational school, or preparation
for the workforce.184
At least at the high school level, this model of IEP development
would not be substantially different from what is currently required under the IDEA. Once a student with a disability reaches the age of sixteen,
the IEP must include transition services.185 As a coordinated set of activities for a student with a disability, transition services are designed to be
181. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1335
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016).
182. See, e.g., IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:11(B) (2015) (discussing what makes a search reasonable); BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 3:22 (2nd ed. 2015)
(discussing reasonable person standard); RICHARD B. TROXEL & WILLIAM O. KERR, KERR AND
TROXEL, CALCULATING IP DAMAGES § 5:2 (2015); EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 23:35 (2015).
183. These evaluations would set the initial path plan for the student. However, the appropriate
path for a child may change over the course of high school. Preparation for post-secondary life is so
crucial and high school is the public school system’s last opportunity to prepare the student. Thus,
how schools specifically handle adequately preparing the student for adult life is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
184. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(b) (2014).
185. Id.
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results oriented and focused on improving academic and functional
achievement of the student to facilitate movement from high school to
post-secondary activities.186 These services include preparation for college, vocational school, or appropriate employment and living independently as an adult.187 The student’s individual needs must form the
basis of the transition services.188 Further, the services must take the student’s strengths, preferences, and interests into consideration.189 Thus,
the IDEA requires that schools actually consider a student’s potential
once they reach a certain age. The standard this Comment proposes
simply extends this requirement to all ages while the child is in public
school.
Under this legal standard, a school provides a FAPE to a student
with a disability when that student makes reasonable progress toward his
or her annual goals. If at any level of schooling the student is not able to
make reasonable progress utilizing the services the school is capable of
providing, the school has failed to provide the student with a FAPE. As
allowed under the IDEA, the student’s parents could then elect to transfer
the child to a specialized school that is capable of providing services that
will not amount to the denial of a FAPE.190 Most importantly, because
the public school will have failed to provide the student with a FAPE, the
parents can more often successfully request reimbursement from the public school district for the cost of the specialized school’s tuition, provided
the evidence shows the student is making reasonable progress at the specialized school.191
E. Benefits of Reasonable Progress Standard
The Rowley Court decided on the some educational benefit standard
because that standard best served Congressional intent as evidenced by
the language and legislative history of the EHA.192 The IDEA amendments as well as NCLB clearly show Congressional intent has
changed.193 Congress is no longer only concerned with providing students with disabilities access to education.194 The goals of special education have expanded to providing students with disabilities an education
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(A) (2012).
187. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 773.
188. Id.
189. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(B) (2012).
190. 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2014).
191. See id.; Johnson, supra note 40, at 43. However, at present, reimbursement is a rare outcome of these cases. For example, in Colorado, where Drew lives, of the 23 cases requesting reimbursement between 2003 and 2013, only two were successful at the due process hearing level. See
Colorado Department of Education, Case Outcomes - Due Process Hearings, COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.cde.state.co.us/spedlaw/caseoutcomes (last visited Feb.
15, 2016).
192. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192–97, 200–01 (1982).
193. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 773; Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 18.
194. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 773.
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that will prepare them for life after school.195 The reasonable progress
standard serves this goal. The focus of this standard is always on the student’s future. When educators aim towards preparing the student for the
next level of education, they will be less likely to set goals for the student
that are based on the low standard of only giving the student some benefit. Further, the reasonable progress standard honors Congressional intent
to better prepare students with disabilities for some degree of independent living rather than dependence on the community.196
In addition to honoring Congressional intent, the reasonable progress standard addresses the Supreme Court’s concern that, were it to
espouse a standard requiring schools to consider students’ potential,
schools would be overburdened in the pursuit of maximizing the potential of each child that has a disability.197 The reasonable progress standard does not require schools to maximize students’ potential. Instead, it
simply brings the requirements schools must meet up to the same level as
general education students. When an IEP is based on results, such as
reasonable progress, it becomes a comprehensive plan as to how to help
the student reach the standards the state applies to the nondisabled students in public schools.198
Finally, by shifting to the reasonable progress standard, courts could
help reduce the amount of public resources devoted to caring for adults
with disabilities who never received an education that would adequately
prepare them for adulthood. Adoption of this standard will require elementary and middle schools to make substantial changes to IEP development as well as the provision of services to students with disabilities to
ensure each student receives a FAPE, resulting in increased expenses for
public schools.199 Nevertheless, the reduced public expenditures formerly
dedicated to caring for adults with disabilities who are unable to provide
for themselves will offset these increased costs.200 Given a proper education, children with disabilities are more likely to grow into adults that
possess the skills that will give them the chance at independent living,
including self-care and higher education or vocational training.201
195. Id.
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012); Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 15; Valentino,
supra note 15, at 165.
197. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 199 (1982).
198. See Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 527.
199. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 776.
200. See CAROL V. O’SHAUGHNESSY, NATIONAL SPENDING FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND
SUPPORT (LTSS), 2012 3 (Mar. 27, 2014) (discussing billions of dollars spent on long-term care
services for disabled individuals in 2012); Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work: The Startling Rise of
Disability in America, Planet Money, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (last visited Nov. 9, 2015)
http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/ (indicating that 19.2% of newly disabled workers in 2011 had a
mental illness or developmental disability).
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F. Endrew Could Have Been the Opportunity to Set a New Standard
Aside from being an excellent example of why the Rowley standard
must be set aside, other aspects of Endrew gave rise to an opportunity for
the Tenth Circuit to lay the foundation for a new legal standard to evaluate IEP adequacy. First, Endrew relied heavily on the precedent set in
Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P ex rel. Jeff P., the reasoning of
which is in conflict with current Congressional intent.202 Second, in Endrew, the lack of progress monitoring provided an opening to require a
results-based standard like the reasonable progress standard.203
Endrew follows Tenth Circuit precedent that conflicts with national
education policy created through the IDEA and NCLB. Endrew relied in
part on Thompson, which reasoned that “Congress did not provide . . . a
guarantee of self-sufficiency for all [persons with disabilities], and the
most authoritative arbiter of congressional intent has already reached this
conclusion [in Rowley].”204 The Thompson court further reasoned that
although the ability to generalize skills is crucial to self-sufficiency, the
IDEA did not make self-sufficiency the standard.205 However, the IDEA
now requires schools to implement transition services that prepare the
student for post-secondary life.206 The transition services requirement is
directly in line with one of the IDEA’s stated purposes: to prepare children with disabilities for independent adult life.207 This requirement,
along with the fact that Rowley interpreted legislation Congress has substantially updated, suggests that Thompson conflicts with Congressional
intent, making it less than authoritative precedent.
As for the child in Thompson, if he never acquires the ability to
generalize his educational skills outside of the classroom, the transition
services his high school must provide will be difficult, if not impossible,
to accomplish. Although Thompson finds support in the intent of the
EHA, it now fails to keep up with the capabilities of individual with disabilities as well as special educational goals and policy. Even accepting
as true that the panel that decided Endrew lacked the authority to subvert
established precedent, the panel could have acknowledged the reasoning
that supported Rowley and Thompson is no longer true.
Although the panel failed to recognize that the present national special education policy is not the same as it was when Rowley was decided,
it did acknowledge “Drew’s IEPs contain[ed] little or no progress reporting or measurement data and where progress was reported, it was ‘lack202. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 (10th
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016). See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1)
(2012); Wenkart, supra note 36, at 15.
203. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1335.
204. Wenkart, supra note 36, at 15.
205. Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008).
206. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(b) (2014).
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012).

2016]

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

25

ing in detail’ or limited to ‘conclusory statements.’”208 However, Drew’s
parents classified the progress monitoring differently, asserting the
school never reported the results of Drew’s progress.209 Despite acknowledging the lack in progress monitoring, the Endrew court reasoned
that because the goals listed on each year’s IEP increased in difficulty,
the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide Drew with some educational benefit.210 However, other courts have found when the student has
ASD, as Drew does, without “meaningful, measureable goals and objectives, there can be no ‘appropriate and meaningful education and developmental interventions . . . .’”211 Therefore, in the absence of evidence in
the form of documented, measurable results that Drew met the goals of
lesser difficulty before the school increased the difficulty of those goals,
the reasoning in Endrew lies in an unfounded assumption based on
meaningless, generalized opinions of progress.212 Requiring results, as
would be necessary under the reasonable progress standard, would provide a foundation on which a court could rest its assertion that schools
are providing children with disabilities a FAPE.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our judicial system should strive to put into action the values Congress stated in 1974: that education of United States citizens is of primary importance and that one’s resources should not limit one’s educational
opportunities.213 This goal cannot be realized as long as courts continue
to adhere to the Rowley standard. Rowley sets expectations for students
with disabilities too low, pitting parents, special educators, and school
administrators against one another.214 Further, it encourages courts to be
narrowly focused and minimalistic in their approach to IEP and FAPE
evaluation.215
Most significantly, Rowley couched its reasoning in honoring Congressional intent.216 Both the amendments to the EHA, now known as the
IDEA, and the enactment of NCLB demonstrate Congress intends to
provide students with disabilities with more than mere access to public
education.217 Congress now seeks to raise the expectations schools have
of students with disabilities and adequately prepare them for adulthood
208. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1335.
209. Reply Brief at 1–4, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d
1329 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1417).
210. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1341.
211. Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1274 (S.D. Ala. 2005).
212. Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 516 (quoting Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d
1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003)).
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 (2012).
214. Johnson, supra note 40, at 26.
215. Id. at 28.
216. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192 (1982).
217. Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 47, at 5, 17.
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and independent living.218 Applying Rowley only frustrates these pursuits, requiring development of a new legal standard.
The reasonable progress standard would support not only national
education values but also the purposes of the IDEA by focusing on the
student’s future and requiring reporting of progress results. In addition to
supporting Congressional intent, implementation of the reasonable progress standard could reduce public expenditures that fund the care and
support of adults with disabilities.
Endrew failed to consider any of the deficiencies Rowley presents,
or that it is time to develop a new standard. The Tenth Circuit ignored
the fact that the Douglas County could not have known whether Drew
was making progress, as the school had not recorded any of the supposed
progress in his IEPs.219 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit unquestioningly
followed precedent that conflicts with Congressional intent.220 The values behind providing public education mandate more than blind obedience to precedent and refusal to see the real-life consequences of not
demanding to know public schools are providing an appropriate education to students with disabilities. Congress has taken action to effect
those values; it is time the courts follow suit by disavowing Rowley and
developing a new legal standard to determine whether a child with a disability is receiving the free appropriate public education that he or she
deserves.
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